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The Stability of Walrasian General Equilibium
Herbert Gintis and Antoine Mandel∗
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Abstract
We prove the stability of equilibrium in a completely decentralized Walrasian
general equilibrium economy in which prices are fully controlled by eco-
nomic agents, with production and trade occurring out of equilibrium.
Journal of Economic Literature Classifications:
C62—Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
D51—Exchange and Production Economies
D58—Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Economies
1 Introduction
Walras (1954 [1874]) developed a general model of competitive market exchange,
but provided only an informal argument for the existence of a market-clearing equi-
librium for this model. Wald (1951 [1936]) provided a proof of existence for a sim-
plified version of Walras’ model, and this proof was substantially generalized by
Debreu (1952), Arrow & Debreu (1954), Gale (1955), Nikaido (1956), McKenzie
(1959), Negishi (1960), and others.
Walras was well aware that his arguments had to backed by a theory of price
adjustment that would ensure convergence and stability of the equilibrium. He
considered that the key force leading to equilibrium was competition, which he
saw materializing in the regular updating of prices by economic agents. In his own
words:
The markets that are best organized from the competitive standpoint
are those in which. . . the terms of every exchange are openly announced
and an opportunity is given to sellers to lower their prices and to buy-
ers to raise their bids (Walras 1954 [1874], paragraph 41).
∗The authors contributed equally to this research. Gintis: Santa Fe Institute and Central European
University; Mandel: Paris School of Economics University Paris 1 Panthe´on-Sorbonne. The authors
acknowledge the support of Institute for New Economic Thinking grant INO1200022.
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However, he thought that a model where economic agents individually update their
prices would be to hard to track analytically and that a centralized model of price
adjustment mimicking individual behavior (the auctioneer playing the role of a
representative agent as far as price dynamics are concerned) would suffice to prove
the stability of the equilibrium.
The stability of the Walrasian economy was a central research focus in the
years following the existence proofs (Arrow and Hurwicz 1958, 1959, 1960; Ar-
row, Block and Hurwicz 1959; Nikaido 1959; McKenzie 1960; Nikaido and Uzawa
1960). Following Walras’ taˆtonnement process, these models assumed that there
is no production or trade until equilibrium prices are attained, and out of equilib-
rium, there is a price profile shared by all agents, the time rate of change of which
is a function of excess demand. These efforts at proving stability were success-
ful only by assuming narrow and implausible conditions (Fisher 1983). Indeed,
Scarf (1960) provided simple examples of unstable Walrasian equilibria under a
taˆtonnment dynamic.
Several researchers then explored the possibility that allowing trading out of
equilibrium could sharpen stability theorems (Uzawa 1959, 1961, 1962; Negishi
1961; Hahn 1962; Hahn and Negishi 1962, Fisher 1970, 1972, 1973), but these ef-
forts enjoyed only limited success. Moreover, Sonnenschein (1973), Mantel (1974,
1976), and Debreu (1974) showed that any continuous function, homogeneous of
degree zero in prices, and satisfying Walras’ Law, is the excess demand function for
some Walrasian economy. These results showed that no general stability theorem
could be obtained based on the taˆtonnement process. Indeed, subsequent analy-
sis showed that chaos in price movements is the generic case for the taˆtonnement
adjustment processes (Saari 1985, Bala & Majumdar 1992).
A novel approach to the dynamics of large-scale social systems, evolution-
ary game theory, was initiated by Maynard Smith & Price (1973), and adapted to
dynamical systems theory in subsequent years (Taylor & Jonker 1978, Friedman
1991, Weibull 1995). The application of these models to economics involved the
shift from biological reproduction to behavioral imitation as the mechanism for the
replication of successful agents.
We apply this framework by treating the Walrasian economy as the stage game
of an evolutionary process. We assume each agent is endowed in each period with
goods he must trade to obtain the various goods he consumes. There are no inter-
period exchanges. An agent’s trade strategy consists of a set of private prices
for the good he produces and the goods he consumes, such that, according to the
individual’s private prices, a trade is acceptable if the value of goods received is
at least as great as the value of the goods offered in exchange. The exchange
process of the economy is hence defined as a multipopulation game where agents
use private prices as strategies.
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Competition materializes when a seller who slightly undercuts his competitors
increases his sales and hence his income or when a buyer who overbids his com-
petitors increases his purchases and hence his utility. In other words, when markets
are in disequilibrium, there are always agents who have incentives to change their
prices. More precisely, under rather mild conditions on the trading process, Wal-
rasian equilibria are the only strict Nash equilibria of private prices games. Thus,
if we assume that the strategies of traders are updated according to the replicator
dynamic, the stability of equilibrium is guaranteed (see weibull (1995)).
Hence, the adjunction of private prices to the general equilibrium model allow
on the one hand to propose a model closer to Walras original insights where prices
are controlled by economic agents as in actual markets and on the other hand to re-
visit the issue of stability using game-theoretic and evolutionary insights to analyze
the dynamic adjustment of prices to their equilibrium values.
The paper is organized as follows: section two introduces games with private
prices in general exchange economies, section three reviews the stability properties
of evolutionary dynamics and gives an introductory example of their application to
games with private prices. Section four proves the stability of equilibrium in a
stylized setting where the kinds of goods consumed and sold by each agent are
independent of relative prices and section five extends this result to an arbitrary
exchange economy. Section six discusses in more details the necessary condition
for competition to byte on the price adjustment process in a setting with private
prices. Section seven concludes.
2 The Walrasian Economy with Private Prices
We shall explore the stability of Walrasian equilibrium in an economy with a finite
number of goods, indexed by h = 1, . . . , l, and a finite number of agents, indexed
by i = 1, . . . ,m (see e.g Arrow & Debreu (1954)). Agent i hasRl+ as consumption
set, a utility function ui : Rl+→R+ and an initial endowment ei ∈ Rl+. This
economy is denoted by E(u, e).
In this setting an allocation x ∈ (Rl+)m of goods is feasible if it belongs
to the set A(e) = {x ∈ (Rl+)m ∑mi=1 xi ≤∑mi=1 ei} and the demand of an
agent i is the mapping di : Rl+ → Rl+ that associates to a price p ∈ Rl+ the
utility-maximizing individual allocations satisfying the budget constraint, di(p) :=
argmax{u(xi) xi ∈ Rl+, p · xi ≤ p · ei}. A feasible allocation x ∈ A(e) then is an
equilibrium allocation if there exists a price p ∈ S such that for all i, xi ∈ di(p).
We shall denote the set of such equilibrium prices by E(u, e).
The issue of stability is relevant only if equilibria actually exist. Let us there-
fore introduce sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium. First, we
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assume about utility functions:
Assumption 1 (Utility) For all i = 1, . . . ,m, ui is continuous, strictly concave,
and locally non-satiated.
This assumption ensures the existence of a quasi-equilibrium (see e.g Floren-
zano 2005), that is an attainable allocation x∗ ∈ A(e) and a price p∗ ∈ Rl+ such
that ui(xi) > ui(x∗i ) implies p
∗ · xi > p∗ · x∗i . Note that the strict concavity is not
necessary for the existence of a quasi-equilibrium but implies demand mappings
are single-valued, which will prove useful below.
To ensure that every quasi-equilibrium is an equilibrium allocation, it suffices
to assume that at a quasi-equilibrium the agents do not receive the minimal possible
income (see Hammond 1993, Florenzano 2005):
Assumption 2 (Income) For every quasi-equilibrium (p∗, x∗), and for every i =
1, . . . ,m, there exists xi ∈ Rl+ such that p∗ · x∗i > p∗ · xi.
This condition is satisfied under the survival assumption (i.e when all initial
endowments are in the interior of the consumption set) as well as in settings with
corner endowments such as those investigated in Gintis (2007).
It is standard to show that under Assumptions (1) and (2) the economy E(u, e)
has at least an equilibrium (see Florenzano 2005). We shall assume in the following
they do hold and moreover restrict attention to the generic case where the economy
has a finite set of equilibria (see Balasko 2009) .
From Walras’ perspective, such an equilibrium should be the outcome of free
competition among economic agents. Walras himself considered free competition
to materialize in actual market exchanges characterized by free entry and exit, the
capacity of producers to choose their level of production and, most importantly
for our purposes, the freedom to propose and to accept echanges based upon their
own assessment of the appropriate prices for the different goods (Dockes & Potier
2005). In Walras’ words:
As buyers, traders make their demand by outbidding each other. As
sellers, traders make their offers by underbidding each other. . . The
markets that are best organized from the competitive standpoint are
those in which. . . the terms of every exchange are openly announced
and an opportunity is given to sellers to lower their prices and to buyers
to raise their bids (Walras 1954 [1874], paragraph 41).
Walras argues that, although in actual markets prices are controlled by economic
agents themselves, he introduced the centralized taˆtonnement in the belief that the
4
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stability of the price adjustment process would be thereby simplified. This belief
was mistaken.
We show here that a model of price adjustment closer to Walras’ vision of the
actual functioning of competitive markets allows to prove convergence to equilib-
rium in a general setting. The key innovation of the model is allowing the prices to
be controlled by economic agents themselves. Namely, we consider that each agent
i is characterized by a private price pi ∈ Rl+ whose coordinates represent the prices
at which he is willing to sale the goods he supplies to the market and the maximum
prices he is willing to pay for the goods he demands. Whatever structure one then
considers for an exchange process, from a sequence of bilateral interactions as in
Gintis (2007) to the simultaneous and multilateral exchanges implicitly considered
in most general equilibrium models, the resulting allocation must be determined
by the distribution of private prices. In other words, the exchange process will be
modeled as a game where agents use private prices as strategies.
We shall associate with the economy E(u, e) the class of games G(u, e, ξ)
where:
• Each agent has a finite set of prices P ⊂ Rl+ as strategy set.
• The game form is defined by an exchange mechanism ξ : Pm→A(e) that
associates to a profile of private prices pi = (p1, . . . , pm) an attainable allo-
cation ξ(pi) = (ξ1(pi), . . . , ξm(pi)) ∈ A(e).
• The payoff φi : Pm→R+ of player i is evaluated according to the utility of
the allocation it receives, that is φi(pi) = ui(ξi(pi)).
As strategic price set, we will mostly consider below that P = K l−1 × {1},
where K ⊂ R+ is a finite set of commodity prices with minimum pmin > 0 and
maximum pmax > pmin while good l is used as a numeraire and its price is fixed
equal to 1. In any case, we will consider the price set P contains each of the finite
number of equilibrium price profiles of the economy.
The exchange process ξ can be the outcome of a sequence of bilateral trades of
the kind described in Gintis (2007,2012), where trades are proposed on the basis of
demands computed at private prices and accepted or refused on the basis of values
computed at private prices. One can also consider simpler exchange process where,
as in the standard taˆtonnement process, no trade takes place unless excess demand
vanishes, for example the exchange process ξ0 such that
ξ0i (pi) =
{
di(p) if for all i, pii = p ∈ E(u, e)
ei otherwise.
(1)
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The adjunction of such private prices games to the general equilibrium model
allow on us the one hand to propose a model closer to Walras original insights
where prices are controlled by economic agents as in actual markets and on the
other hand to revisit the issue of stability using game-theoretic analysis for the
dynamic adjustment of prices to their equilibrium values.
3 Evolutionary Stability of Equilibrium
We shall here focus on evolutionary dynamic, in particular on the replicator dy-
namic. This focus is motivated first by the observation that a major mechanism
leading to convergence of economic behaviour is imitation in which poorly per-
forming agents copy the behavior of, or are replaced by copies of, better-performing
agents, second by the evidence of convergence of prices towards equilibrium ob-
tained by simulation of stochastic evolutionary models in Gintis (2007) and third
by the close relationships between stochastic evolutionary models and determinis-
tic replicator dynamics (Helbing 1996, Benaim & Weibull 2003). More generally,
replicator dynamics appears as the backbone of a wealth of adaptive processes
ranging from reinforcement learning (Bo¨rgers & Sarin 1997) to bayesian updating
(Shalizi 2009).
In the multipopulation game G(u, e, ξ), the replicator dynamics is defined as
follows. First, the space of mixed strategies for player i is defined as
∆i =
{
σi ∈ RP+ |
∑
p σi,p = 1
}
.
In an evolutionary context, an element σi ∈ ∆i is interpreted as a population of
players of type i whose share σi,p uses the private price p ∈ P . The replicator
dynamic then prescribes that the share of agents using price p in the population
i should grow proportionally to the utility it is expected to yield in the exchange
process under the assumption that trade partners are drawn uniformly in each of
the populations. This yields the system of differential equations defined for all
i = 1, . . . , n and p ∈ P by:
∂σi,p
∂t
= σi,p
(
Eσ−i(ui(ξ(p, ·)))− Eσ(ui(ξ(·))
)
(2)
where Eσ−i(ui(ξ(p, ·))) represents the expected utility of the strategy p given the
mixed strategy profile σ−i, that is
Eσ−i(ui(ξ(p, ·))) =
∑
ρ∈Pm−1
(
∏
j 6=i
σj,ρj )ui(ξ(p, ρ),
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and Eσ(ui(ξ(·)) represents the expected utility of the mixed strategy σi given the
mixed strategy profile σ−i; that is
Eσ(ui(ξ(·)) =
∑
pi∈Pm
(
m∏
j=1
σj,pij )ui(ξ(pi)).
For the replicator dynamic in a multi-population game, a strategy profile is
asymptotically stable for the replicator dynamics if and only if it is a strict Nash
equilibrium of the underlying game (see e.g Weibull 1995 and Appendix A below).
In the game G(u, e, ξ),, a price profile pi ∈ Pm is a strict Nash equilibrium if and
only if for all i = 1 · · ·m, and all p 6= pii, one has ui(pi) > ui(p, pi−i) and one
hence has following Weibull 19951:
Proposition 1 A price profile pi ∈ Pm is asymptotically stable for the replicator
dynamic if and only if for all i = 1 · · ·m, and all p 6= pii, one has ui(pi) >
ui(p, pi−i).
Hence, private price games provide a consistent model of dynamic stability
of equilibrium in an economy E(u, e) whenever these equilibria can be identified
with strict Nash equilibria of the game G(u, e, ξ). Let us for example consider
economies E(u, e) for which there are gains to trade in the sense of
Assumption 3 (Gains to trade) For every p ∈ E(u, e),we have for all i = 1 · · ·m :
ui(di(p)) > ui(ei)).
For every such economy, the exchange process ξ0 introduced above is such that:
• At a strategy profile in which two or more agents use a non-equilibrium price,
each agent is allocated his initial endowment and no unilateral deviation can
modify this allocation, so that the profile is a non-strict Nash equilibrium
• At a strategy profile in which all agents but one use the same equilibrium
price, each agent is allocated his initial endowment. Under Assumptions (3),
the “non-equilibrium” agent makes everyone strictly better-of by deviating to
the equilibrium price as each agent is then allocated his equilibrium demand.
So, such a strategy profile is not a Nash equilibrium.
• At a strategy profile in which all agents use the same equilibrium price p,
each agent receives the equilibrium allocation ui(di(p)). Under Assump-
tion 3, an agent deviating to a different price makes everyone strictly worse
off as each agent is then allocated his initial endowment. Hence, the strategy
profile is a strict Nash equilibrium.
1Similar results for a broader class of dynamics follow from the application of the results recalled
in the appendix.
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So that one has:
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 3, pi ∈ Pm is a strict Nash equilibrium of
G(u, e, ξ0) if and only if there exists p ∈ E(u, e) such that for all i, pii = p.
As moreover, at a price p ∈ E(u, e) each agent receives his equilibrium al-
location, the strategy profile (p, · · · , p) can be unambiguously identified with the
corresponding general equilibrium so that one can claim, using Proposition 1, that
for the exchange process ξ0, general equilibria are the only asymptotically stable
states in economies where there are gains to trade. That is:
Proposition 3 Under Assumption (3), the only asymptotically stable strategy pro-
files for the replicator dynamic in the game G(u, e, ξ0) are those in which each
agent uses an equilibrium price p ∈ E(u, e) and is allocated the corresponding
equilibrium allocation di(p).
Proposition 3 hence illustrates that stability results can indeed be obtained for
generic economies thanks to the introduction of private prices. It is worth pointing
out in this respect that the process ξnout can be seen as a decentralized, but naive,
version of the tatonnement process given that no trade takes place until equilibrium
is reached, but convergence requires an extensive search of the state space.
4 Evolutionary Stability with Out of Equilibrium Trading
Considering that agents update their private prices on the basis of the results of
out of equilibrium trading is much more in line with actual economic behavior and
Walras’ original insights. It also gives a much stronger sense of direction to the
replicator dynamic. The analysis is however slightly more technical in this setting.
In order to underline the key mechanisms at play, we will first restrict attention to
a setting where for each agent the set of goods is partitioned between consumption
and production goods, the agent being endowed with production goods only and
deriving utility from consumption goods only (and only if it consumes some of
each).
Assumption 4 (Goods partition) For i = 1, . . . ,m, there exists a partition {Pi, Ci}
of {1, . . . , l} such that:
1. for all h ∈ Pi, ei,h > 0 ;
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2. there exists vi : VCi → R+ such that2:
(a) for all ui(x) = vi(prVCi (x))
(b) vi(x) > 0⇒ ∀h ∈ Ci, xh > 0.
Out-of-equilibrium, there is no public price with regards to which agents can
act as price takers. They must evaluate goods according to their private prices
and determine their behavior accordingly. Namely, we shall consider that agents
evaluate their demand by maximizing utility at private prices and trade only with
peers having compatible prices. If one moreover assumes that there is competition
both among buyers and sellers, so that lowest bidding sellers and highest bidding
buyers have priority access to the market, then it is clear that when there is excess
supply a seller who slightly undercuts his competitors increases his sales and hence
his income while when there is excess demand, a buyer who slightly overbids his
competitors increase his purchases and hence his utility.
Therefore with market disequilibrium, there are always some agents who have
an interest to deviate. Conversely at equilibrium, an agent who deviates either
prices himself out of the market or decreases his consumption and hence his util-
ity. It therefore seems only Walrasian equilibria can be strict/stable Nash equilib-
ria of the private price game. The key difference between ours and the standard
ta´tonnement process is that in our model, each agent is free to change his prices
schedule at will in each period. In market equilibrium, of course, all prices for the
same good are equal, and no agent has an incentive to change his price schedule.
We define the set of buyers of good h as Bh := {i | h ∈ Ci}, the set of sellers
of good h as Sh := {i | h ∈ Pi}, the set of acceptable buyers as those whose prices
is above the lowest buying price, that is Bh(pi) := {i ∈ Bh | pii,h ≥ minj∈Sh pij,h}.
the set of acceptable sellers as those whose prices is below the highest buying price,
that is Sh(pi) := {i ∈ Sh | pij,h ≤ maxi∈Bh pii,h} and the feasible income is
wi(pi) =
∑
{h|i∈Sh(pi)} pii,heh. The set of price feasible allocations A′(e, pi) is then
defined as follows.
Definition 1 The set of price feasible allocations A′(e, pi)is the subset of feasible
allocations A(e, pi) such that for every x ∈ A′(e, pi) one has:
1. xi ≤ di(pii, wi(pi));
2. ∀h ∈ Ci, xi,h > 0⇒ i ∈ Bh(pi)
2For a subset C ⊂ {1, · · · , l}, we define the vector subspace VC as VC := {x ∈ Rl | ∀h 6∈
C, xh = 0} and pVC as the projection on VC .
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3.
∑
i∈Bh(pi) xi,h ≤
∑
j∈Sh(pi) ej,h
Following the above discussion, condition 1 expresses the fact that demand are
computed at private prices. Note that it is equivalent for our purposes to assume
that each agent satisfies its private budget constraint, that is pii · xi ≤ wi(pi). Con-
dition 2 ensures that only buyers with acceptable prices have access to the market.
Condition 3 ensures that only sellers with acceptable prices have access to the mar-
ket. Stronger conditions, requiring for examples that agents only trade with peers
using the same price, could be put forward but the present framework allows to dis-
tinguish between the delimitation of the trade space and the competitive advantages
of buyers/sellers with high/low private prices, which is characterized below. In a
sense, the definition of price-feasible allocations embed incentives for the agents to
use common prices while assumption (6) below characterizes profitable deviations.
The set A′(e, pi) can be seen as a bargaining set defined by the agents’ private
prices. The choice of an allocation within this bargaining set can be simulated
numerically by an algorithmic implementation of the trading process as in Gintis
(2007), but for our theoretical purposes, characterizing the exchange process ξ ax-
iomatically as a solution of the bargaining problemA′(e, pi) will prove more useful.
We shall therefore assume that the exchange process is an efficient and monotonic
solution to the bargaining problem A′(e, pi). As far as efficiency is concerned, we
shall only require it to hold when pi is an equilibrium price profile, that is is such
that for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, pii = p where p ∈ E(u, e).
Assumption 5 (Bargaining Axioms) The exchange process ξ is such that:
1. (Efficiency) If pi is an equilibrium price profile, ξi(pi) is Pareto optimal in
A′(e, pi).
2. (Monotonicity) If pi and pi′ are such that A′(e, pi) ⊂ A′(e, pi′) then for all
i = 1 · · ·n, one has ui(ξi(pi′)) ≥ ui(ξi(pi)).
Our efficiency condition is weaker than what is standard in the bargaining lit-
erature and will allow us to identify equilibrium price profiles played in the game
G(u, e, ξ) with the corresponding Walrasian equilibria of the economy E(u, e). The
monotonicity condition is standard in the bargaining literature since the seminal pa-
per by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975).
Eventually, to prove stability we must ensure that competition is effective and
that buyers have incentive to update their prices when there is excess demand.
Walras’ law implies that when the price profile pi is uniform, that is when there
10
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exists p ∈ P such that for all i, pii = p, there is necessarily excess demand for one
good unless the economy is in market equilibrium. As a matter of fact, our main
results only require that agents have incentive to update their prices when the price
profile is uniform.
Assumption 6 (Buyer’s Incentive to Change) If pi = (p, · · · , p) ∈ Pm is a uni-
form price profile and there exists an h ∈ {1, · · · , l} such that
m∑
i=1
di,h(p, wi(pi)) >
m∑
i=1
ei,h,
then there exists p′ ∈ P such that ui(ξi(p′, pi−i)) ≥ ui(ξi(pi)).
Assumption (6) is the counterpart of Walras’ description of buyers raising their
bids to price out competitors. It could perhaps be taken as face value, as is the
updating of prices by the auctioneer. Nevertheless, sufficient conditions for its
satisfaction are extensively discussed below. One should yet note that it could
symmetrically be assumed that sellers have incentives to decrease their prices when
their is excess supply but the proof would be a little more involved. However,
increasing their prices when there is excess demand is not a viable strategy for
sellers as they price themselves out of the market if the buyers do not update their
prices.
Now, Assumptions (4) through (6) imply that the only strict Nash equilibria of
G(u, e, ξ) are the Walrasian equilibria of E(u, e). Namely:
Proposition 4 Under Assumptions (4) – (6), pi ∈ Π is a strict Nash equilibrium of
G(u, e, ξ) if and only if there exists p ∈ E(u, e) such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
pii = p.
Proof: Suppose pi is an equilibrium price profile, that is pi is such that for all
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, pii = p where p ∈ E(u, e). Condition (1) in the definition of
A′(pi, e) then implies that for all i, ξi(pi) ≤ di(p). As ξi(pi) is Pareto optimal in
A′(e, pi) according to assumption (5.1) and (d1(p), · · · , dm(p)) ∈ A′(pi, e), it can
only be that for all i, ξi(pi) = di(p).
Assume agent i deviates to price p 6= p. Then:
• If there is h ∈ Pi such that ph > ph, one has i 6∈ Sh(p′, pi−i) and agent i can
no longer sale good h and does not rise any income on the good h market. If
there is h ∈ Pi such that ph < ph, one clearly has pheh < pheh. All in all,
one clearly has wi(p′, pi−i) ≤ wi(pi), the inequality being strict whenever
ph 6= ph for at least an h ∈ Pi.
11
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Now, with regards to consumption,
• if there exists h ∈ Ci such that ph < ph, then i 6∈ Bh(p′, pi−i) and ξi,h(p′, pi−i) =
0, so that according to assumption (4.2b), ui(ξi,h(p′, pi−i)) = 0 < ui(di(p)).
• Otherwise for all h ∈ Ci one has ph ≥ ph and either the inequality is
strict for at least an h and wi(p′, pi−i) ≤ wi(pi) or none of the inequal-
ity is strict but according to the preceding wi(p′, pi−i) < wi(pi). In any
case, one has ui(di(p′, wi(p′, pi−i))) < ui(di(p)) so that ui(ξi(p′, pi−i)) ≤
ui(di(p
′, wi(p′, pi−i))) < ui(di(p)) = ui(ξi(pi)).
To sum up, if agent i deviates to price p′ either his income or his choice set or both
are strictly reduced: he cannot by definition obtain an allocation as good as di(p)
and hence is strictly worse off.
Suppose then pi is not an equilibrium price profile.
• If pi is a uniform price profile and there exists an h ∈ {1, · · · , l} such that∑m
i=1 di,h(p, wi(pi)) >
∑m
i=1 ei,h, then assumption (6) implies pi is not a
(strict) Nash equilibrium.
Hence, from here on we can assume that pi is not a uniform price profile.
• If there exists h ∈ {1, · · · , `} and i ∈ Sh/Sh(pi), by setting p′h := maxi∈Bh pii,h
and p′j := pii,j for all j 6= h one obtains a population pi′ := (p′, pi−i) such
that wi(pi′) ≥ wi(pi) while the other constraints in the definition of A′ can
only be relaxed. Therefore, A′(e, pi) ⊂ A′(e, pi′). According to assumption
(5.2), it can not be that pi is a strict Nash equilibrium. Similar arguments
apply whenever there exists h ∈ {1, · · · , `} and i ∈ Bh/Bh(pi).
• Otherwise, one must have Bh = Bh(pi), Sh = Sh(pi), and there must exist
i, i′ ∈ {1, · · · ,m} and h ∈ {1, · · · l} such that pii,h 6= pii′,h, e.g pii,h < pii′,h.
One then has:
– If i, i′ ∈ Sh by setting pi′i,h = pii′,h and pi′j,k = pij,k for j 6= i′ or k 6= h,
one has wi(pi′) ≥ wi(pi) and hence A′(e, pi) ⊂ A′(e, pi′) so that pi can
not be a strict Nash equilibrium according to assumption (5.2) The
same holds true if i ∈ Sh and i′ ∈ Bh.
Hence, from here on we can assume that for all i, i′ ∈ Sh, pi′i,h = pii′,h.
Then:
12
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– If i, i′ ∈ Bh by setting pi′i′,h = pii,h and pi′j,k = pij,k for j 6= i or k 6= h,
the private budget constraint of agent i′ (condition 1 in definition of
A′) is relaxed and one then has A′(e, pi) ⊂ A′(e, pi′) so that pi can not
be a strict Nash equilibrium according to assumption (5.2)
– If i ∈ Bh and i′ ∈ Sh, it must be, given that Sh = Sh(pi), that there
exist i′′ ∈ Bh such that pii′,h ≤ pii′′,h and the preceding argument
applies to i, i′′ ∈ Bh such that pii,h < pii′′,h.
Summing up, pi cannot be a strict Nash equilibrium of G(u, e, ξ) if it is not an
equilibrium price profile in the Walrasian sense. This ends the proof.
Through proposition 1, proposition 4 admits the following dynamical counter-
part.
Proposition 5 Under assumptions (4) through (6), the only asymptotically stable
strategy profiles for the replicator dynamic in G(u, e, ξ) are those for which each
agent uses an equilibrium price p ∈ E(u, e) and agent i is allocated his equilibrium
allocation di(p).
In other words, in every economy satisfying assumption (4) and for every ex-
change process based on private prices satisfying assumptions (5) and (6), Wal-
rasian equilibria are the only asymptotic stable states for the replicator dynamics.
5 Extension to an arbitrary economy
Propositions 4 and 5 require that the goods an agent buys and sells be fixed in-
dependently of relative prices. This assumption can be relaxed by localizing the
notions of acceptable buyers and sellers defined in the preceding section. In the
following, we do not assume that assumption 4 holds and consequently adapt the
definitions and proofs of the preceding section (incidentally, we slightly overload
some of the notations).
Given a population pi, we define the set of buyers of good h as Bh(pi) :=
{i | di,h(pii) > ei,h}, the set of sellers of good h as Sh(pi) := {i | di,h(pii) ≤
ei,h}, the set of acceptable buyers as those agents whose prices is above the lowest
selling price that is Bh(pi) := {i ∈ { 1, · · ·m} | pii,h ≥ minj∈Sh(pi)/{i} pij,h}. the
set of acceptable sellers as those agents whose prices is below the highest buying
price, that is Sh(pi) := {i ∈ { 1, · · ·m}/{i} | pij,h ≤ maxi∈Bh(pi) pii,h} and the
feasible income as wi(pi) =
∑
{h|i∈Sh(pi)} pii,heh. The key differences with the
preceding section is that here an acceptable buyer (resp. seller) is not necessarily
13
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a buyer (resp. seller). In particular, at an uniform price profile (i.e when all the
agents use the same private price), each agent is both an acceptable buyer and an
acceptable seller. However in order to avoid tautological definitions, an agent can’t
autonomously qualify himself as an acceptable buyer (resp. seller).
The set of price feasible allocations A′′(e, pi) is then defined as follows
Definition 2 The set of price feasible allocations A′′(e, pi)is the subset of feasible
allocations A(e, pi) such that for every x ∈ A′′(e, pi) one has:
1. xi ≤ di(pii, wi(pi));
2. ∀h, ∀i ∈ Bh(pi), xi,h > ei,h ⇒ i ∈ Bh(pi);
3.
∑
i∈Bh(pi)∩Bh(pi)(xi,h − ei,h) ≤
∑
j∈Sh(pi)(ej,h − xj,h)
The key difference with definition (1) is that the conditions that applied to
individual demand or supply there, apply here on individual excess demand or
excess supply. Still, assumption (5) as an exact counterpart:
Assumption 7 (Bargaining Axioms Bis) The exchange process ξ is such that:
1. (Efficiency) If pi is an equilibrium price profile, ξi(pi) is Pareto optimal in
A′′(e, pi).
2. (Monotonicity) If pi and pi′ are such that A′′(e, pi) ⊂ A′(e, pi′) then for all
i = 1 · · ·n, one has ui(ξi(pi′)) ≥ ui(ξi(pi)).
Assumptions (6) and (7) then suffice to establish the counterpart of proposition
(4) but for the two following caveats. First, the definition of acceptable sellers
and buyers prevent an agent from being the sole buyer and seller of a given good.
Therefore, we have to assume that (at least at equilibrium) there are at least a buyer
and a distinct seller for every good. Second, in our framework the change of the
private price of a commodity he neither consumes nor is endowed with has no
effect whatsoever on an agent’s utility, so that two strategies that differ only for
such a good yield exactly the same utility. This might prevent the identification of
Walrasian equilibria with strict equilibria. In order to avoid this failure, one shall
assume that either each agent consumes or is endowed with each good or that an
agent’s strategy space is reduced to meaningful prices: these of commodities he
consumes or sells.
Assuming both conditions fulfilled, we can proceed with the proof of the fol-
lowing proposition , which is very similar to that of proposition (4) and hence
given in the appendix.
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Proposition 6 Under Assumptions (6) and (7), pi ∈ Π is a strict Nash equilibrium
of G(u, e, ξ) if and only if there exists p ∈ E(u, e) such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
pii = p.
6 Sufficient Conditions for Competition
It remains to analyze how restrictive is assumption (6) about buyers’ incentive
to increase prices when there is excess demand. Walras’ description of buyers
raising their bids is the report of an empirical observation, the “natural” expression
of competition. We shall investigate here how this idea of competition can be
grounded in the exchange process ξ.
Let us first consider a basic example with two agents and two goods. The
first agent derives utility from consumption of good 2 only, e.g his utility func-
tion is u1(x1, x2) = x2, and is endowed with a quarter unit of good 1, i.e his
initial endowment is e1 = (
1
4
, 0). The second agent has Cobb-Douglas preferences
u2(x1, x2) = x1x2 and initial endowment e2 = (
1
4
,
3
4
). Good 2 is the nume´raire
and is price is fixed equal to one. It is straightforward to check that the only equi-
librium is such that the price equals (1, 1), agent 1 is allocated (0,
1
4
) and agent 2 is
allocated (
1
2
,
1
2
). It is also clear that if both agents adopt (1, 1) as private price, the
only efficient price feasible allocation is the equilibrium one. Yet, if both agents
adopt (p, 1) as private price, then the demands of agent 1 and 2 respectively are
d1(p) = (0,
p
4
) and d2(p) = (
1
8
+
3
8p
,
p
8
+
3
8
). Whenever p < 1, there is ex-
cess demand for good 1 and the only efficient allocation is (0,
p
4
) to agent 1 and
(
1
2
,
3− p
4
) to agent 2. Let us examine assumption (6) in this setting. Agent 1 who
is not rationed would be worse off if he decreased his private price for good 1 and
hence its income, he cannot increase it unilaterally as he would price himself out
of the market. Agent 2 cannot decrease his private price for good 1 as he would
price himself out of the market. One would expect that “competition” induces him
to increase his price for good 1 but he has no incentive to do so as this would only
decrease his purchasing power and hence his utility. The key issue is that agent 2
actually faces no competition on the good 1 market as there is no other buyer he
could outbid by increasing his price.
Let us then consider a more competitive situation by “splitting in two” agent 2.
That is we consider an economy with three agents and two goods. The first agent
still has utility function u1(x1, x2) = x2, and initial endowment e1 = (
1
4
, 0). The
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second and third agent have Cobb-Douglas preferences u2(x1, x2) = u3(x1, x2) =
x1x2 and initial endowment e2 = e3 = (
1
8
,
3
8
). As above, It is straightforward
to check that the only equilibrium is such that the price equals (1, 1), agent 1 is
allocated (0,
1
4
) while agents 2 and 3 are allocated (
1
4
,
1
4
). It is also clear that if both
agents adopt (1, 1) as private price, the only efficient price feasible allocation is the
equilibrium one. Now, if each agent adopts (p, 1) as private price, then the demands
respectively are d1(p) = (0,
p
4
) and d2(p) = d3(p) = (
1
16
+
3
16p
,
p
16
+
3
16
).
Whenever p < 1, there is excess demand for good 1. It seems natural to assume
that the exchange process would then allocate its demand d1(p) = (0,
p
4
) to agent
1 who is not rationed. As far as agents 2 and 3 are concerned, the allocation is
efficient provided they are allocated no more than their demand
1
16
+
3
16p
in good
1. It seems sensible to consider that the allocation is symmetric and hence that both
agents are allocated (
1
4
,
3− p
8
) and so are rationed in good 1. As before agent 1
has no incentive to change his private price for good 1 and neither agents 2 nor
3 can further decrease their private price for good 1. However, if the exchange
process implements a form of competition between buyers by fulfilling in priority
the demand of the agent offering the highest price for the good, then agents 2 and 3
have an incentive to increase their private prices for good 1. Indeed assume that
agent 2 increases his private price for good 1, so q > p. He will then be allocated
his demand (
1
16
+
3
16q
,
q
16
+
3
16
) and be better off than at price p provided that
(
1
16
+
3
16q
)(
q
16
+
3
16
) >
1
4
.
3− p
8
. It is straightforward to check that this equation
holds for q = p (whenever p < 1) and hence by continuity in a neighborhood of p.
In particular, there exists q > p such that agent 2 is better of adopting q as private
price for good 1.
The above examples show that necessary conditions for assumption (6) to hold
are potential and actual competition among buyers, respectively via the presence
of more than one buyers for every good and the priority given to highest bidding
buyers in the trading process. It turns out these two conditions are in fact sufficient.
Since Edgeworth (1881) , notably in (Debreu & Scarf 1963), the seminal way
to ensure competition is effective in a general equilibrium economy is to consider
that the economy consists of sufficiently many replicates of a given set of primitive
types. For our purposes, it suffices to assume that the economy E(u, e) is a 2-fold
replicate of some underlying simple economy.
Assumption 8 (Replicates) For every i ∈ {1 · · ·m} there exists i′ ∈ {1 · · ·m}/{i}
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such that ui = ui′ and ei = ei′ . Types i and i′ are called replicates.
In our framework, a companion assumption is to consider that the exchange
process is symmetric with respect to replicates using the same private price. That
is:
Assumption 9 (Symmetry) For every pi ∈ Pm, if i, i′ ∈ {1 · · ·m} are replicates
such that pii = pii′ , then ξi(pi) = ξi′(pi).
Then, to ground in the exchange process ξ actual effects of competition, we
shall assume that if there is excess demand for one good the highest bidding seller
has priority access to the market. That is a buyer who deviates upwards from a
uniform price profile has its demand fulfilled in priority.
Assumption 10 (High Bidders Priority) Let pi = (p, · · · , p) ∈ Pm be a uniform
price profile, i, i′ ∈ {1, · · · ,m} be replicates and pi′ a price profile such that
pi′i,h > ph for every h ∈ Ci and pij,k = pk otherwise. Then defining
Xi(pi
′) = {xi ∈ Rl+ | xi ≤ ξi(pi) + ξi(pi′) and pi′ixi ≤ pi′iei},
we have
ui(ξi(pi
′)) ≥ max
xi∈Xi(pi′)
ui(xi).
That is, given that agent i gains priority over his replicate by decreasing its
price, everything goes as if he could pick any allocation satisfying his private bud-
get constraint in the pool formed by adding the allocations he and his replicates
were formerly allocated.
As announced, the latter conditions suffice to ensure that competition holds in
the sense of assumption (6). Namely, one has
Proposition 7 If assumptions (4), (5), (8), (9), and (10) hold, then assumption
(6) holds.
Proof: Let pi = (p, · · · , p) ∈ Pm be a uniform price profile such that for some
h ∈ {1, · · · , l}, one has ∑mi=1 di,h(p, wi(pi)) > ∑mi=1 ei,h, . We shall prove that
there exists p′ ∈ P such that ui(ξi(p′, pi−i)) ≥ ui(ξi(pi)). If there exists i such
that for some h ∈ Ci, ξi,h(pi) = 0, the proof is straightforward according to
assumption (4). Otherwise, let us then consider an agent i such that ξi,h(pi) <
di,h(pii, wi(pi)). It is then clear, given condition 1 in the definition of A′, that
ui(ξi(pi)) < ui(di,h(pii, wi(pi)). Hence it must either be that:
• the private budget constraint of agent i is not binding, that is one has p ·
ξi(pi) < p · ei,
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• or there are budget neutral utility improving shifts in consumption, that is
there exists v ∈ Rl+ such that vh = 0 for all h 6∈ Ci and p · v = 0 such that
for all sufficiently small t > 0, ui(ξi(pi) + tv) > ui(ξi(pi)).
In the case where agent i private budget constraint is not binding it is clear, given
assumption 10, that agent i can still afford and obtain ξi(pi)if he shifts to a price
p′ ∈ P such that p′h > ph for every h ∈ Ci, p′h >= ph otherwise and p′ is
sufficiently close to p. In the latter case where for all sufficiently small t > 0, one
has ui(ξi(pi) + tv) > ui(ξi(pi)), denoting by i′, the replicate of i (who receives
the same allocation according to assumption (9) ) one has for t > 0 sufficiently
small: (ξi(pi) + tv) ≤ ξi(pi) + ξi′(pi). Then for any p′ such that p′h > ph for
every h ∈ Ci, and p′h >= ph, let us set xi(p′) =
p′ · ei
p · ei (ξi(pi) + tv). One clearly
has xi(p′) ≤ ξi(pi) + ξi′(pi) and p′ · xi(p′) ≤ p′ · ei. This implies according to
assumption (10) that ξi(pi′)) ≥ ui(xi(p′)) (where p′ is defined as in assumption
(10)). Moreover, for p′ sufficiently close to p, one has using the continuity of the
utility that ui(xi(p′)) > ui(ξi(pi)). This ends the proof.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that the equilibrium of a Walrasian market system is a strict Nash
equilibrium of an exchange game in which the requirements of the exchange pro-
cess are quite mild and easily satisfied. Assuming producers update their private
price profiles periodically by adopting the strategies of more successful peers, we
have a multipopulation game in which strict Nash equilibria are asymptotically
stable in the replicator dynamic. Conversely, all stable equilibria of the replicator
dynamic are strict Nash equilibria of the exchange process and hence Walrasian
equilibria of the underlying economy.
The major innovation of our model is the use of private prices, one set for each
agent, in place of the standard assumption of a uniform public price faced by all
agents, and the replacement of the ta´tonnement process with a replicator dynamic.
The traditional public price assumption would not have been useful even had a
plausible stability theorem been available using such prices. This is because there
is no mechanism for prices to change in a system of public prices—no agent can
alter the price schedules faced by the large number of agents with whom any one
agent has virtually no contact.
The private price assumption is the only plausible assumption for a fully decen-
tralized market system not in equilibrium, because there is in fact no natural way
to define a common price system except in equilibrium. With private prices, each
individual is free to alter his price profile at will, market conditions alone ensuring
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that something approximating a uniform system of prices will prevail in the long
run.
There are many general equilibrium models with private prices in the literature,
based for the most part on strategic market games (Shapley & Shubik 1977, Sahi
& Yao 1989, Giraud 2003) in which equilibrium prices are set on a market-by-
market basis to equate supply and demand, and it is shown that under appropriate
conditions the Nash equilibria of the model are Walrasian equilibria. These are
equilibrium models, however, without known dynamical properties, and unlike our
approach they depend on an extra-market mechanism to balance demand and sup-
ply.
The equations of our dynamical system are too many and too complex to
solve analytically or to estimate numerically. However, it is possible to construct
a discrete version of the system as a finite Markov process. The link between
stochastic Markov process models and deterministic replicator dynamics is well
documented in the literature. Helbing (1996) shows, in a fairly general setting,
that mean-field approximations of stochastic population processes based on imi-
tation and mutation lead to the replicator dynamic. Moreover, Benaim & Weibull
(2003) show that large population Markov process implementations of the stage
game have approximately the same behavior as the deterministic dynamical sys-
tem implementations based on the replicator dynamic. This allows us to study
the behavior of the dynamical market economy for particular parameter values.
For sufficiently large population size, the discrete Markov process captures the dy-
namics of the Walrasian economy extremely well with near certainty (Benaim &
Weibull 2003). While analytical solutions for the discrete system exist (Kemeny &
Snell 1969, Gintis 2009), they also cannot be practically implemented. However,
the dynamics of the Markov process model can be studied for various parameter
values by computer simulation (Gintis 2007, 2012).
Macroeconomic models have been especially handicapped by the lack of a
general stability model for competitive exchange. The proof of stability of course
does not shed light on the fragility of equilibrium in the sense of its susceptibility
to exogenous shocks and its reactions to endogenous stochasticity. These issues
can be studied directly through Markov process simulations, and may allow future
macroeconomists to develop analytical microfoundations for the control of exces-
sive market volatility.
Appendix A: Asymptotic stability and replicator dynamics
Let G be an n-player game with finite strategy sets {Si|i = 1, . . . , n}, the cardinal
of which is denoted by ki = |Si|, with strategies indexed by h = 1, . . . , ki and pay-
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off functions {pii|i = 1, . . . , n}. Let ∆i = {σi ∈ Rki |∀h, σi,h ≥ 0 and
∑ki
h=1 σi,h =
1} the which is the mixed strategy space of agent i, and let ∆ = ∏mi=1 ∆i. In an
evolutionary game setting, an element σi ∈ ∆i represents a population of players i
with a share σi,h of the population playing strategy h ∈ Si.
Dynamics for such population of players (σ1, . . . , σN ) ∈ ∆ are defined by
specifying, a growth rate function g : ∆ → R
∑m
i=1 ki , for all i = 1, . . . , n and
h = 1, . . . , ki:
∂σi,h
∂t
= σi,hgi,h(σ) (3)
We shall restrict attention to growth-rate functions that satisfy a regularity con-
dition and maps ∆ into itself (Weibull 1995).
Definition 3 A regular growth-rate function is a Lipschitz continuous function g
defined in a neighborhood of ∆ such that for all σ ∈ ∆ and all i = 1, . . . , n we
have has gi(σ) · σi 6= 0.
The dynamics of interest in a game-theoretic setting are those that satisfy min-
imal properties of monotonicity with respect to payoffs. Strategies of player i in
Bi(σ) := {s ∈ Si|ui(s, σ−i) > ui(σ)} that have above average payoffs against
σ−i, have a positive growth-rate in the following sense:
Definition 4 A regular growth-rate function g is weakly payoff-positive if for all
σ ∈ ∆ and i = 1, . . . , n,
Bi(σ) 6= 0⇒ gi,h > 0 for some si,h ∈ Bi(σ), (4)
where si,h denotes the hth pure strategy of player i.
Among the class of weakly-payoff positive dynamics, the replicator dynamic
is by far the most commonly used to represent the interplay between population
dynamics and strategic interactions. It corresponds to the system of differential
equations defined for all i = 1, . . . , n and h = 1, . . . , |Si| by:
∂σi,h
∂t
= σi,h(pii(si,h, σ−i)− pii(σ)). (5)
That is thus the system of differential equation corresponding to the growth rate
function gi,h(σ) = pii(si,h, σ−i)− pii(σ).
It is standard to show that the system of differential equations (3) associated
with a regular and weakly-payoff monotonic growth function has a unique solution
defined at all times for every initial condition in ∆. We will generically denote the
solution mapping by ψ : R+ × ∆ → ∆, so ψ(t, σ0) gives the value at time t of
the solution to (3) with initial condition σ(0) = σ0. Stability properties of (3), are
then defined in terms of this solution mapping:
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Definition 5 A strategy profile σ∗ ∈ ∆ is called Lyapunov stable if every neigh-
borhood V of σ∗ contains a neighborhood W of σ∗ such that ψ(t, σ) ∈ V for all
σ ∈W ∩∆.
Definition 6 A strategy profile σ∗ ∈ ∆ is called asymptotically stable if it is Lya-
punov stable and there exists a neighborhood V of σ∗ such that for all σ ∈ V ∩∆ :
lim
t→+∞ψ(t, σ) = σ
∗.
Appendix B: Proof of proposition 6.
The proof of proposition 6 proceeds as follows.
Proof: Suppose pi is an equilibrium price profile, that is pi is such that for all
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, pii = p where p ∈ E(u, e). Condition (1) in the definition of
A′′(pi, e) then implies that for all i, ξi(pi) ≤ di(p). As ξi(pi) is Pareto optimal in
A′′(e, pi) according to assumption (5.1) and (d1(p), · · · , dm(p)) ∈ A′′(pi, e), it
can only be that for all i, ξi(pi) = di(p).
Assume agent i deviates to price p 6= p and let pi′ = (p, pi−i). Then:
• If there is h such that ph > ph, one has i 6∈ Sh(pi′) and agent i can no
longer sale good h and does not rise any income on the good h market. If
there is h such that ph < ph, one clearly has phei,h < phei,h. Given that at
the equilibrium price profile pi, every agent is an acceptable seller for every
good so that wi(pi) =
∑`
h=1 pii,hei,h, it follows that wi(pi
′) ≤ wi(pi), the
inequality being strict unless ei,h = 0 for every h such that ph 6= ph.
• If the latter condition holds, there must be h such that ph 6= ph and ei,h = 0
(so that for any price profile ρ, i ∈ Bh(ρ)). For any h such that ph < ph,
then i 6∈ Bh(pi′) and one necessarily has ξi,h(p′, pi−i) = 0 according to the
definition of A (and given that ei,h = 0).
• Hence agent i can only consume goods h such that ph ≥ ph.
• To sum up, if agent i deviates to price p′ his income and his choice set are
both reduced and one of them is strictly reduced. He cannot by definition
obtain an allocation as good as di(p) and hence is strictly worse off.
Suppose then pi is not an equilibrium price profile.
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• If pi is a uniform price profile and there exists an h ∈ {1, · · · , l} such that∑m
i=1 di,h(p, wi(pi)) >
∑m
i=1 ei,h, then assumption (6) implies pi is not a
(strict) Nash equilibrium.
Hence, from here on we can assume that pi is not a uniform price profile. Then:
• If there exists h ∈ {1, · · · , `} and i ∈ Sh(pi)/Sh(pi), by setting p′h :=
maxi∈Bh(pi)/{i} pii,h and p
′
j := pii,j for all j 6= h one obtains a popula-
tion pi′ := (p′, pi−i) such that wi(pi′) ≥ wi(pi) while the other constraints in
the definition of A′′ can only be relaxed. Therefore A′′(e, pi) ⊂ A′′(e, pi′).
According to assumption (5.2), it can not be that pi is a strict Nash equilib-
rium. Similar arguments apply whenever there exists h ∈ {1, · · · , `} and
i ∈ Bh(pi)/Bh(pi).
• Otherwise, one must have Bh(pi) ⊂ Bh(pi), Sh(pi) ⊂ Sh(pi), and there
must exist i, i′ ∈ {1, · · · ,m} and h ∈ {1, · · · l} such that pii,h 6= pii′,h, e.g
pii,h < pii′,h. One then has:
– If i, i′ ∈ Sh(pi) by setting pi′i,h = pii′,h and pi′j,k = pij,k for j 6= i′
or k 6= h, one has wi(pi′) ≥ wi(pi) while the other constraints in the
definition of A′′ can only be relaxed. Therefore A′′(e, pi) ⊂ A′′(e, pi′)
so that pi can not be a strictNash equilibrium according to assumption
(5.2) The same holds true if i ∈ Sh(pi) and i′ ∈ Bh(pi).
Hence, from here on we can assume that for all i, i′ ∈ Sh, pi′i,h = pii′,h.
Then:
– If i, i′ ∈ Bh(pi) by setting pi′i′,h = pii,h and pi′j,k = pij,k for j 6= i
or k 6= h, the private budget constraint of agent i′ (condition 1 in
definition of A′′) is relaxed and one then has A′′(e, pi) ⊂ A′′(e, pi′)
so that pi can not be a strictNash equilibrium according to assumption
(5.2)
– If i ∈ Bh(pi) and i′ ∈ Sh(pi), it must be, given that Sh = Sh(pi), that
there exist i′′ ∈ Bh such that pii′,h ≤ pii′′,h and the preceding argument
applies to i, i′′ ∈ Bh(pi) such that pii,h < pii′′,h.
Summing up, pi cannot be a strict Nash equilibrium of G(u, e, ξ) if it is not an
equilibrium price profile in the Walrasian sense. This ends the proof.
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